Prior to receiving their medical degrees Israeli medical graduates (and foreign doctors) must participate in a year-long internship program. By and large, interns are not assigned to hospitals on the basis of merit, since the government wants to spread the more talented interns everywhere. Since merit is not a criterion, it makes sense to use some form of lottery to assign the interns. For many years, the lottery which was chosen was Random Serial Dictatorship, with some house rules.
Each year, two different cohorts of students enter independent lotteries which determine where each student performs her internship. The number of interns allocated to each hospital is determined independently for each cohort. The first cohort is composed of students who are in their final year of their medical school in Israel. This cohort is the more interesting and diverse one, the second cohort consists of graduates of foreign schools, who want to become Israeli doctors. For the foreign cohort, the internship lottery is run by the Ministry of Health (MoH). There are no votes or appeals, and rules are simpler. For the Israeli cohort, the MoH just decides on the capacities, and delegates the rest of the lottery process to a committee of students, elected by the student body.
In 2014 we redesigned the lottery, replacing it with a more efficient one (our method is also in use this year). This paper presents the market, the redesign process and the new mechanism which is now in use.
We were first approached in 2010 by several medical students who asked for help in redesigning their market, we also took part in the internship committee of 2011, where we've understood their two main requirements of the market: The first is the Do No Harm (DNH) principle which states that the redesign process should not hurt any population of students. Everyone should be (weakly) better off in the new design (at least in expectation). The second is that in particular, students should have the option of matching together, just like they did up until then. A couple should get a guarantee that they will be matched together.
To cope with the DNH principle, we ran surveys, in which we gave students two possible vectors of probabilities (for being assigned to each hospital), and asked them which is better. We took the data, and tried to find a simple utility model for it. The model we ended up using is that there are m hospitals, and you have probability p to get to rank i, this gives you p(m − i + 1) 2 points of happiness, and a profile with more happiness points is better. Given that we have a definition of happiness, we first compute for every intern what would be her expected happiness under RSD. Then we choose allocation probabilities to maximize total happiness, conditioned on capacities and on the DNH principle -that every agent is happier under the current algorithm. Given the probability matrix, we decompose it to a convex sum of assignment matrices, and choose a matrix at random (according to the weights).
In the past, any two students were allowed to declare that they are a "couple" and be matched together (that is, to the same hospital) by receiving only one joint turn in the Random Serial Dictatorship. The committee required us to give couples the same option under the new algorithm -which was the students internship committee's second condition. Similar to several other algorithms for assignment of indivisible objects (e.g., Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) , Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)), our algorithm "trades" probabilities among participants (based on their preferences), and reaches a stochastic matrix that has to be decomposed into a convex combination of valid assignments. The last step uses the famous Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition process [Birkhoff 1946; Von Neumann 1953] . The fact that couples cannot be split imposes (hard) complementarity constraints, which invalidates some of the assignments, and consequently the decomposition process may become harder or even impossible. In this paper we first show that not only is the problem often not solvable when there are couples, but also that it is NP-hard to determine whether a given stochastic matrix with couples can be decomposed. We also show it is possible to approximate such a decomposition in polynomial time. The approximation is tight and its quality is reciprocal to the smallest hospital capacity.
We also use anonymized preferences data provided by the MoH to subsample and test our algorithm performance. We find that our algorithm often performs significantly better on actual data (compared to the theoretical bounds we establish). We drew preference profiles from the union of all data points, then we used our assignment mechanism to generate the assignment matrix, to which our Algorithm was applied. While in theory only ensures approximation quality of 2/q (where q is the smallest hospital size), we can clearly see in Figure 1 that although in our case q = 4, the average performance of our algorithm is far better than 1 2 (the red vertical line). 
